Is psychology relevant to personal identity? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, 1994: 173-86.
Human people or human animals? Philosophical Studies 80, 1995: 159-81.
Why I have no hands. Theoria 61, 1995: 182-197.
Composition and coincidence. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77, 1996: 374-403.
Dion’s foot. Journal of Philosophy 94, 1997: 260-65.
Was I ever a fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57, 1997: 95-110. Reprinted in revised form in R. Nichols et al., eds., Philosophy Through Science Fiction, Routledge 2008. Russian translation, Omsk Scientific Bulletin 6, 2021: 113-123.
Relativism and persistence. Philosophical Studies 88, 1997: 141-62.
The ontological basis of artificial life. Artificial Life 3, 1997: 29-39 doi:10.1162/artl.1997.3.1.29
Human atoms. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76, 1998: 396-406.
There is no problem of the self. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5, 1998: 645-57, and in S. Gallagher and J. Shearer, eds., Models of the Self, Imprint Academic 1999. Reprinted in B. Gertler and L. Shapiro, eds., Arguing About the Mind, Routledge 2007.
Reply to Lynne Rudder Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 1999: 161-66.
A compound of two substances. In K. Corcoran, ed., Soul, Body, and Survival. Cornell University Press, 2001: 73-88.
Material coincidence and the indiscernibility problem. Philosophical Quarterly 51, 2001: 337-55.
Personal identity and the radiation argument. Analysis 61, 2001: 38-43.
Thinking animals and the constitution view. Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind, 2001.
What does functionalism tell us about personal identity? Noûs 36, 2002: 682-98.
Thinking animals and the reference of ‘I’. Philosophical Topics 30, 2002: 189-208.
An argument for animalism. In R. Martin and J. Barresi, eds., Personal Identity, Blackwell 2003: 318-34. Reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions 2e, Blackwell 2008; in M. Rea, ed., Arguing About Metaphysics, Routledge 2009; in J. Lizza, ed., Defining the Beginning and End of Life, Johns Hopkins University Press 2009; in J. Kim et al., eds., Metaphysics: An Anthology 2e, Blackwell 2011; and in S. Hetherington, ed., Metaphysics and Epistemology: A Guided Anthology, Blackwell 2013.
Lowe’s defence of constitutionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 53, 2003: 92-95.
Was Jekyll Hyde? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 2003: 328-348.
Warum wir Tiere sind. In K. Petrus, ed., On Human Persons, Ontos Verlag 2003: 11-22.
Animalism and the corpse problem. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, 2004: 265-74.
Imperfect identity. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, 2006: 81-98.
Is there a bodily criterion of personal identity? In F. MacBride, ed., Identity and Modality, Oxford University Press 2006: 242-259.
Temporal parts and timeless parthood. Noûs 40, 2006: 738-752.
The paradox of increase. The Monist 89, 2006: 390-417. Reprinted in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman, eds., Metaphysics: The Big Questions, 2e, Blackwell 2008.
What are we? Journal of Consciousness Studies 14: 5-6 (special issue: Dimensions of Personhood), 2007: 37-55, and in A. Laitinen and H. Ikäheimo, eds., Dimensions of Personhood, Imprint Academic 2007.
Précis of The Human Animal and Replies. Abstracta special issue 1, 2008.
The rate of time’s passage. Analysis 69, 2009: 3-9.
The passage of time. In R. Le Poidevin et al., eds., The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, 2009: 440-48.
Ethics and the generous ontology. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (special issue: Personal Identity and Bioethics), 2010: 259–270. Reprinted in M. Guta, ed., Taking Persons Seriously: Where Philosophy and Bioethics Intersect, Pickwick Publications, in press.
Immanent causation and life after death. In G. Gasser, ed., Personal Identity and Resurrection, Routledge 2010: 51-66.
The extended self. Minds and Machines 21 (special issue: The Construction of Personal Identities Online), 2011: 481-495.
Identity, quantification, and number. In T. Tahko, ed., Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics, CUP 2012: 66-82.
In search of the simple view. In G. Gasser and M. Stefan, eds., Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? CUP 2012: 44-62.
The person and the corpse. In B. Bradley, et al., eds., The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death, OUP 2013: 80-96.
The Epicurean view of death. Journal of Ethics 17 (special issue: The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-Existence), 2013: 65-78.
The metaphysical implications of conjoined twinning. Southern Journal of Philosophy 52, Spindel Supplement, 2014: 24-40.
The nature of people. In S. Luper, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Life and Death, CUP 2014: 30-46.
Animalism and the remnant-person problem. In J. Fonseca and J. Gonçalves, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on the Self, Peter Lang 2015: 21-40.
Life after death and the devastation of the grave. In M. Martin and K. Augustine, eds., The Myth of an Afterlife, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015: 409-423.
On Parfit’s view that we are not human beings. In A. O’Hear, ed., Mind, Self and Person, Cambridge University Press 2015: 39-56. Italian translation in Points of Interest: Rivista di Indagine Filosofica e di Nuove Pratiche della Conoscenza 3, II, 2018 (special issue: Concerning Personal Identity: Starting from Derek Parfit), 47-71.
What does it mean to say that we are animals? Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12 special issue: The First-Person Perspective and the Self), 2015: 84-107.
The role of the brainstem in personal identity. In A. Blank, ed., Animals: New Essays, Philosophia 2016: 291-302.
The remnant-person problem. In S. Blatti and P. Snowdon, eds., Animalism, OUP 2016: 145-161.
Properties as parts of ordinary objects. In J. Keller, ed., Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes from van Inwagen, OUP 2017: 62-79.
The central dogma of transhumanism. In B. Berčič, ed., Perspectives on the Self, University of Rijeka 2017: 35-58.
Ben’s body reads the Guardian. Chinese Semiotic Studies 13 (4), 2017: 367-380.
Radical resurrection and divine commands. In S. Cushing, ed., Heaven and Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield 2018: 29-44.
The zombies among us. Noûs 52, 2018: 216–226.
For animalism. In J. Loose, et al., eds., The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, 2018: 297-306.
Swinburne’s brain transplants. Philosophia Christi 20, 2018: 21-29.
Narrative and persistence (with Karsten Witt). Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49(3), 2019: 414-434.
The metaphysics of artificial intelligence. In M. Guta, ed., Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties, Routledge 2019: 67-84. Chinese translation in Jianghai Academic Journal 2021 (3): 115-122; digest reprinted in Philosophy of Science and Technology 2021 (9): 31-37 and in Xinhua Wenzhai 2021 (22): 150-153.
Parfit’s metaphysics and what matters in survival. Argumenta 9 (special issue: Persons, Reasons, and What Matters: The Philosophy of Derek Parfit), 2019: 21-39.
Against person essentialism (with Karsten Witt). Mind 129, 2020: 715-735.
What is the problem of biological individuality? In J. Dupré and A. S. Meincke, eds., Biological Identity: Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Biology, Routledge 2021: 63-85.
The dualist project and the remote-control objection. Roczniki Filozoficzne (Annals of Philosophy) 69 (Book symposium on R. Swinburne, Are We Bodies or Souls?), 2021: 89-102.
Vasilyev’s argument against psychophysical supervenience. Date Palm Compote 6 (special issue: Local natural supervenience and causation), 2021: 12-13.
Personhood and the relation between metaphysics and value. In J. Noller, ed., The Unity of a Person: Ontology, Subjectivity, Normativity, Routledge 2022: 5-22.
Lowe’s non-Cartesian dualism. In M. Szatkowski, ed., E. J. Lowe and Ontology, Routledge 2022: 225-238.
The metaphysics of transhumanism. In K. Hübner, ed., Human: A History. OUP 2022: 381-403. Chinese translation in YueJiang Academic Journal, 2022 (4): 107-119.
Partial twinning and the boundaries of a person. Belgrade Philosophical Annual 36 (special issue: Personal Identity), 2023: 7-24.
The problem of people and their matter. TheoLogica 8 (2) special issue: Essays in Honor of Dean Zimmerman, 2024.